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Abstract. The exponential growth of wireless-based solutions, such as
those related to the mobile smart devices (e.g., smart-phones and tablets)
and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, has lead to countless advantages
in every area of our society. Such a scenario has transformed the world a
few decades back, dominated by latency, into a new world based on an
efficient real-time interaction paradigm. Recently, cryptocurrency have
contributed to this technological revolution, the fulcrum of which are
a decentralization model and a certification function offered by the so-
called blockchain infrastructure, which make it possible to certify the
financial transactions, anonymously. However, it should be observed how
this challenging scenario has generated new security problems directly re-
lated to the involved new technologies (e.g., e-commerce frauds, mobile
bot-net attacks, blockchain DoS attacks, cryptocurrency scams, etc.).
In this context, we can acknowledge that the scientific community ef-
forts are usually oriented toward specific solutions, instead to exploit
all the available technologies, synergistically, in order to define more effi-
cient security paradigms. This paper aims to indicate a possible approach
able to improve the security of people and things by introducing a novel
blockchain-based distributed paradigm to security defined Internet of
Entities (IoE). It represents an effective mechanism for the localization
of people and things, which exploits both the huge number of existing
wireless-based devices and the blockchain-based distributed ledger tech-
nology, overcoming the limits of traditional localization approaches, but
without jeopardizing the user privacy. Its operation is based on two core
elements with interchangeable roles, entities and trackers, which can be
very common elements such as smart-phones, tablets, and IoT devices,
and its implementation requires minimal efforts thanks to the existing
infrastructures and devices. The possibility of including further informa-
tion to those of localization, such as those generated by device sensors,
gives rise to a novel and widely exploitable data environment, whose
applications can be extended to contexts different from that of the local-
ization of people and things, e.g., eHealth, Smart Cities, and so on.
Keywords: Internet · Internet of Things · Internet of Entities · Mobile
Network · Blockchain · Distributed Ledger · Localization · Security
1 Introduction
The meaning of the personal security is day after day closer to that of the data
security. This is given by the growing number of activities related with everyday
life, which are somehow performed in a virtual way (e.g., requests for documents,
job applications, purchases, and so on).
Such a scenario has been further revolutionized by the decentralized paradigm
introduced with the advent of the Bitcoin [14] cryptocurrency, which has traced
a new way to exchange currency. A synergistic combination of security and
anonymity stands at the base of its success, since this paradigm allows the
users to exchange currency without the need to involve trusted authorities as
intermediates.
The strategy behind this revolutionary way to operate is mainly based on
a digital signature scheme, which is combined with the effort needed to solve
a quite hard mathematical problem, but the real fulcrum of this mechanism is
an immutable public ledger where all the transactions are recorded. It is im-
plemented on the so-called blockchain-based infrastructure by exploiting a dis-
tributed consensus protocol that operate in a peer-to-peer network [49].
The idea on which the proposed IoE paradigm revolves is the exploitation of
the wireless-based ecosystem, where some existing devices (hereinafter referred
to as trackers) are used in order to track the activity of other devices associated
to people or things (hereinafter referred to as entities), registering a series of
immutable information about the latter ones by using the features offered by a
blockchain-based distributed ledger. This idea relies on what affirmed by several
authoritative studies, which indicate that by the end of this decade the number
of smart-phones and tablets will be about 7.3 billion of units [53], as well as the
number of IoT devices, which will be between 20 and 50 billion by 2020 [56].
Although in a rather coarse manner, Figure 1 shows the placement of the
proposed IoE paradigm, with respect to the other already existing wireless-based
paradigms: it is straddled on their operative areas.
The implementation of such a paradigm can be made by adding simply func-
tionalities to the existing devices used as trackers (IoT, Smart-phones, etc), since
we only need to append few entity data (i.e., unique identifier and sensors data)
with few tracker data (e.g., time-stamp, geographic location, sensors data, etc.)
and sent them to a blockchain-based distribute ledger. It should be observed
that in case of devices such as smart-phones and tablets, such a operation can be
performed in a quite transparent way, by installing a simple application, while
for the IoT devices, it can be done by performing a software update.
About the entity-side of this scenario, an interesting aspect related to the IoE
paradigm is its capability to exploit as entities both custom devices (e.g., light
wearable devices) or existing widespread devices (e.g., smart-phones). In addi-
tion, the IoE paradigm operates anonymously, since only the entity owner can
associate its unique identifier to the registration performed on the remote ledger
through the trackers. The inclusion, when it is applicable, of one or more neigh-
bor entities (i.e., those detected by the tracker near the entity within a given
time-frame) offers an additional tracing opportunity, since it allows us to recon-
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struct an entity activity in a wide manner, without jeopardize the anonymity of
the involved neighbor entities.
In should be observed how in addition to the domain strictly related to
security, such as that proposed in this paper, there are other areas where the
IoE paradigm can be profitably exploited (e.g., eHealth, Smart Cities, etc.).
About the eHealth scenario, all the sensors data available in the tracker
environment (temperature, humidity, smog, light level, position, altitude, etc.)
can be combined to those provided by a series of wearable sensors placed on
the entity (e.g., heart rate, pressure, etc.). This configuration allows us to trace,
in an exhaustive manner, the health status of an entity, highlighting hidden
person-environment interactions, otherwise not obvious.
In other words, the data-flow existing between trackers and entities enrich
the information provided by the individual sensors placed on an entity body,
since the IoE environment allows us to add them the information related to
all the sensors placed on the near involved tracker devices. This data-shared
modality provides targeted (and more accurate) measurements and/or alerts,
since it allows the system to have an overview of the real health-status of an
entity, with regards to a specific location and with regard to some near entities.
Similar interactions between entities and trackers can be also exploited in
the Smart Cities context, giving rise to a number of interesting applications.
Considering that the trackers can be devices that operate, specifically, in such
a context, their sensors data can be integrated to those related to a group of
entities in order to create functionalities aimed to specific groups of users.
This is an approach that leads towards two interesting advantages: it is able to
uncover implicit characteristics of the involved entities by following non canon-
ical criteria [17,60]; each group of entities can be anonymously characterized on
the basis of the sensors data of the entities that belong to it.
In light of the previous observations, we can consider the security as one of
the possible application scenarios of the IoE paradigm proposed in this paper,
which main scientific contributions have been summarized in the following:
(i) introduction of the novel concept of entities and trackers, able to exchange
roles, which operates within a specific wireless-based environment;
(ii) definition of interaction models between entities and trackers, and trackers
and blockchain-based distributed ledgers, in terms of unique identification
of the involved devices and communication techniques/protocols;
(iii) formalization of the entity-to-tracker and tracker -to-blockchain-based dis-
tributed ledger communication protocol data structures;
(iv) definition of criteria able to trace an entity by exploiting the previous
blockchain-based distributed ledgers registrations, on the basis of a series
of, directly or indirectly, strategies.
The paper is organized into the following sections: Section 2 provides an
overview about the background and related work; Section 3 reports the adopted
formal notation; Section 4 describes the implementation of the proposed IoE
paradigm; Section 5 discusses about some future directions related to IoE ; Sec-
tion 6 closes the paper with some concluding remarks.
2 Background and Related Work
This section aims to introduce the most important concepts related to the con-
text taken into account in this paper, starting by offering an overview on the
Mobile Network and Internet of Thing concepts, continuing by introducing the
blockchain-based applications together with other concepts that revolves around
them, and concluding with some consideration about the security aspects related
to the aforementioned scenarios.
2.1 Mobile Network
A mobile (or cellular) network is a wireless-based network geographically dis-
tributed in a number of areas defined cells [54,32]. This mechanism based on cells
divides the mobile network area into many of overlapping geographic areas.
It can be imagined as a mesh of hexagonal cells, where each cell has a base-
station (bs) at its center, as shown in Figure 2. A slight overlapping between
neighbor cells offers to the mobile devices a continue radio coverage, since in
this way they are covered by at least one base-station. Such a base-station that
serves a cell works as a hub, since the radio signal transmitted by a mobile device
is retransmitted from the base-station to an other mobile device, transmitting
and receiving by adopting different frequencies in order to avoid interferences.
In addition, the base-stations are connected through a central switching service
that allows them to track the mobile device calls, transferring these from a base-
station to another one, when a mobile device moves between cells.
The most important characteristics of the current mobile network that can
be profitable exploited in the proposed IoE paradigm are the wide coverage
(that offer us a stimulating initial environment) and the high bandwidth (that
allows us to quickly transfer the data between entities and trackers and between
trackers and distributed ledgers).
Fig. 2. Mobile Network Structure
2.2 Internet of Things
In recent years we have seen how Internet has given life to a new revolution
that involves billions of devices. These are characterized by both a low-cost
and a capability to communicate in wireless way through Internet and they
are the main actors of this revolution named Internet of Things (IoT ). Into
the IoT environment operates heterogeneous devices, such as computers, smart-
phones, wearable devices, IP cameras, RFID devices, as well as a large number of
actuators and sensors based on low-cost hardware, which represent the backbone
of the IoT environment.
This gives life to a kind of ecosystem founded on the communication
paradigm, considering that each device can communicate with other devices
and all the devices can communicate with each other without any geographic
limitation, thanks to Internet. Another important IoT characteristic is that each
connected device is uniquely identified.
Premising that an IoT device is potentially able to communicate directly
with another one, a common IoT communication paradigm is that exemplified in
Figure 3: each device communicate to the other ones through two basic activities,
publishing and subscription; it uses a protocol in order to publish data on a server
defined Broker conventionally (in the example of Figure 3, it uses one of the most
common IoT protocols,MQTT 1); other devices can subscribe the published data
by selecting the topic where it has been stored; the topic represents the channel
that allows a selective intercommunication between IoT devices.
Internet of Everything The growth of the Internet of Things model and,
more generally, the growth of the wireless-based technologies, has contributed to
the definition of a model called Internet of Everything [75,27]. Such a model is
characterized by the integration of data, processes, things, and people, combining
several elements that in the past were separated from each other. Some cases in
1 Message Queue Telemetry Transport
Fig. 3. IoT Communication Paradigm
point are the smart things such as smart-watches, eHealth-devices, and smart-
vehicles.
In other words, the Internet of Everything model is used to refer to the in-
telligent interconnection of data, processes, things, and people, a scenario that
involves billions of objects connected over public or private networks by using
different protocols (standard or proprietary), which are able to detect the envi-
ronment around them (sensors) and/or able to interact with it (actuators).
Summarizing, the Internet of Everything model is different from the Internet
of Things one, since its paradigm is based on four elements (data, processes,
things, and people), instead of one (things).
Identity of Things The Identity of Things represents a concept mainly related
to the Internet of Things environment. Basically, it refers to the need to assign
an unique identifier to all objects that operates in such a environment, in order
to allow their real-time interaction with people and other objects (things). A
centered and quite recent example of the aforementioned scenario is that of the
autonomous vehicles [24], where the concept of unique identification becomes
day after day even more crucial [65].
The identifier can be created by using information that characterize, uniquely,
the IoT device such as, for instance, the manufacturer, the serial number, and
so on. Alternatively, the identifier can be assigned to the IoT device by using
a centralized or decentralized assignation remote service, manually or automat-
ically. Some possible approaches able to perform this operation are presented in
Section 4.1.
2.3 Blockchain-based Applications
A blockchain, in the context of the cryptocurrency applications such as Bit-
coin [49,21] and Ethereum [73], represents a shared and transparent distributed
ledger. It allows the users to perform secure financial transaction by exploiting
a cryptographic mechanism and it can be imagined as a ever-growing chain of
blocks, where each block stores a sequence of transactions that are freely in-
spectable by anyone but that are tampering-proof. Each of these blocks contains
the cryptographic signature of the previous one and this mechanism does not
allow anyone to alter or remove a previous block without the removal of all the
blocks after it.
The blockchain functionality can be exploited also in non-financial contexts,
in all the cases where an application needs to ensure trust services. In other
words, such a technology can be used as a platform to define the underlying
trust level of an application. The blockchain ability to verify an identity through
a reliable authentication process [52] is indeed exploited in the context of hetero-
geneous environments, such us, for instance, those related to the eHealth [35,15],
smart cities [13], and IoT [74] applications.
Generalizing the concept, the blockchain can be be profitably used in all
the applications where there is the need to identify an object (people, vehicles,
documents, etc.) in a certain way. For instance, it is used in [1] to get a verifiable
identity through a reliable authentication process, in [76] in order to introduce
blockchain-based intelligent transportation systems, in [47], where the blockchain
has been exploited to define a public identities ledger in the context of an identity
management system, and in [2] in order to face the Value Added Tax (VAT ) fraud
problem.
Double-spending Issue The double-spending issue arises due to the absence
of a central intermediary. Explaining it in a few words, we suppose that Alice has
100-coins and send all of them to Bob: the double-spending problem is related
to the fact that Bob can not know that Alice had sent the same 100-coins to
another person (e.g., Charlie), because there is not a central intermediary (e.g.,
a bank) that verify such a transaction.
This problem, graphically summarized in Figure 4, has been faced by adopt-
ing a distributed time-stamp mechanism able to determine which transactions
should be accepted and which should be rejected. In the context of the Bitcoin
has been adopted a hash-chain mechanism to perform this operation [35].
Fig. 4. Double-spending Issue
Relating to the previous example, hypothesizing that the transaction from
Alice to Charlie is stored in block-1 and the transaction from from Alice to Bob
is instead stored in block-2: through the hash-chain mechanism each participant
can verify that block-1 is older than block-2 by verifying the hashed blockchain,
avoid a double-spending event by rejecting the transaction from Alice to Bob.
Consensus Mechanism The consensus mechanism stands at the base of the
blockchain paradigm, since it allows the system to append new blocks to the
blockchain. In order to perform this operation, this mechanism exploits the so-
called proof-of-work (PoW ) [29], a criterion based on the solution of a mathe-
matical cryptological problem that involves as input the transactions stored into
the block to add to the blockchain.
Literature defines as miners the users that operate in order to solve this
kind of problem. When a miner finds its solution, it is communicated to all the
other users, who confirm its correctness and validate the new block, allowing the
system to append it to the blockchain.
The PoW has been introduced during the Bitcoin [49] formalization and
it assumes that each peer2 votes by using its computational power by solving
the mathematical cryptological problem and adding the current block to the
blockchain. This mechanism, based on the users consensus, is aimed to protect
the system against alterations and other fraudulent activities, since the PoW
activity (i.e., the solution of the mathematical cryptological problem) needs a
very high computation load, which involves resources that are not normally
available for a single user or for a small group of users.
It should be noted that the literature offers other consensus mechanisms to
use instead of the PoW one, such as, for instance, the so-called Proof of Stake
(PoS ) [39].
Distributed Ledger Technology As it emerges from the cited literature ex-
amples, the core of each application based on the blockchain infrastructure is the
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT ). It is indeed clear how the identification
process relies on the functionality offered by such a ledger, which protects the
anonymity of the entities, assuring at the same time a certain identification.
The process of insertion and validation of an operations (e.g., a finan-
cial transaction), carried out by using a distributed public ledger based on the
blockchain, has been exemplified in Figure 5.
Through a blockchain is possible to implement two different type of
ledger: unpermissioned ledger and permissioned ledger (also known as private
blockchain). Well-known example of unpermissioned ledger are the Bitcoin and
Ethereum environments, which have been designed to be open and uncontrolled.
In more detail, they do not have single owners and this means that they allow
anyone to add data to the ledger and any user that uses the ledger has identical
2 Equipotent node: in our case, it represents each blockchain participant.
Fig. 5. Blockchain Distributed Public Ledger
copies of it. Users maintain the ledger integrity by reaching a consensus about
its state.
The unpermissioned ledger are different from the permissioned ones, which
are ledgers where the users need a permission to get the access to them. This
means that, when a new record is added to the ledger, its integrity is checked
by following a restricted consensus process. The blockchain-based permissioned
ledgers add a security level, since the consensus process generates a digital sig-
nature.
In the aforementioned context the term unpermissioned is then a synonym
of the term uncontrollable, and for this reason most of the implementation adopt
the unpermissioned paradigm, since it is the only one able to provide the decen-
tralization that stand at the base of the blockchain philosophy.
The working model adopted by any blockchain-based ledger is based on the
complete storage of all the information since its creation. Such a model produces
a constant and continue increasing of its size and this generates a crucial scala-
bility issue that must be effectively faced in the future [20]. By way of example,
at the beginning of 2018 the size of Bitcoin ledger has been evaluated about
145-gigabyte and that of Ethereum ledger about 40-gigabyte [11].
Decentralized Storage Network The blockchain-based technology also given
rise to a new decentralized model on which the Decentralized Storage Networks
(DSN ) are based. By adopting this model, instead of using many servers (i.e.,
a server farm), as it happens by adopting a canonical centralized storage model,
every network user (node) stores part of network data. Each user has an incentive
to be part of the system and to keep the data available, for reasons similar to
those that regulate the BitTorrent file distribution system, a protocol that adopts
a decentralized model that exploits the capability of the participants to network
peer-to-peer among themselves.
Some examples of blockchain-based decentralized storage approaches are File-
coin3, SAFE Network4, Swarm5, Storj 6, and Sia7.
Considering that the traditional distributed models adopted for the cloud
storage services, such as, for instance, those offered by Amazon’s cloud storage8,
represent a market that generates profits in the billions of dollars: the growth
of the decentralized storage model is cutting out part of this total market. In
addition to offer to the users a cheaper way for data storage, such a decentralized
model also contributes to increase the availability of storage space.
Blockchain and IoT Integration Scenarios characterized by the integration
of blockchain-based infrastructures with IoT devices have been discussed in lit-
erature, such as in [56], where the authors have been identified the following
operative modalities:
– IoT-IoT : it is characterized by a low-latency and an high-level of security,
since the involved IoT devices operates between them for most of the time,
by exploiting the canonic protocols and by limiting the blockchain use for
storing only few information;
– IoT-Blockchain: by following this strategy, all the IoT information are
stored on the blockchain, assuring their immutability and traceability, but
increasing the bandwidth consumption and the latency-time;
– Hybrid Paradigms : this last strategy combines the aforementioned ones, per-
forming part of the activities directly between the IoT devices, limiting to
the data storage activity the interaction with the blockchain.
For the needs of the proposed IoE paradigm, the second and third strategies
(i.e., IoT-Blockchain and Hybrid) are the most suitable, although by adopting
optimized criteria, the best strategy results the Hybrid one, since it is the only
one that allows us to balance the advantages offered by the IoT-IoT and IoT-
Blockchain strategies.
2.4 Security Aspects
Some considerations should also be made about the security scenario related
to the wireless-based technologies, since such a technological evolution did not
keep up with the security one. It means that the big opportunities offered by the
new technologies have been jeopardized by a series of problems that affect the
security in a broad sense.
3 https://filecoin.io/
4 https://safenetwork.org/
5 https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/tree/master/swarm
6 https://storj.io/
7 http://sia.tech/
8 https://aws.amazon.com/
Some cases in point are the frauds related to the E-commerce infrastructure,
which we have been dealt with in [61,62,58,63,64,59], where retroactive, proac-
tive, transformed-domain-based, and multidimensional approaches have been ex-
perimented in order to face such problems, as well as the ever-increasing num-
ber of identity theft [12,18] or, even more simply, the countless frauds made
by exploiting the people’s trust [28,4], often by recurring to social engineering
techniques [46].
Also in the mobile network context we can observe similar problems, because
the smart devices that operate in this environment inherit the security risks that
characterize the Internet-based devices (e.g., desktop computer, laptop, and so
on), such as the aforementioned ones. In addition, there are a series of more
specific risks related to this context [40] such as, for instance, those related to
the bot-net-based attacks [68], or those that jeopardize the user privacy [23].
Even with regard to the blockchain-based technologies (e.g., those related to
the cryptocurrency), their potential advantages have been flanked by a series of
security issues related to the criminal efforts, which are aimed to exploit those
new technologies, fraudulently. In this specific case, the security issues have been
boosted by the fact that such criminal activities can not be easily detected by
surveillance authorities [44].
An example of security issue is related to the blockchain consensus mechanism
needed to add a new block, which involves many people called miners that spend
computation time (GPU /CPU type) to solve a kind of mathematical problem
(hash-checking). A group of people can operate jointly as a mining-pools in order
to mining many blocks and this can leads towards the blockchain control, if the
achieved computing power is at least the 51% of the total [19,22]. This type
of attacks are known in literature as Majority Attack and they have been also
theorized in the famous Satoshi Nakamoto Bitcoin white-paper [49].
It should be observed how the PoW mechanism that stands at the base of
the blockchain paradigm should not be too hard to solve, in order to avoid a
very long block generation time that would bring toward the total block of all
the transactions. However, such a problem can not be overly simple to solve,
because in this case the system would be vulnerable to many types of attacks
such as, for instance, the Denial of Service (DoS ) one [50,71].
Other cases in point about the security issues in this context are the vulner-
abilities that affect the Ethereum smart contracts [7] and the fraudulent games
implemented through the blockchain platform, such as those based on the well-
known Ponzi schemes [5,6]. They have been introduced on the web many years
ago [45,38] and recently re-proposed on Bitcoin [70] and Ethereum [9].
3 Formal Notation
Considering that we use the term entity to indicate a device designed to operate
in a IoE environment, associated to a person or thing, and that we use the term
tracker to indicate a generic (new or already existing) device that operates in
a wireless-based environment, which is aimed to interact with the entities, we
introduce the following formal notation:
(i) we denote as E = {e1, e2, . . . , eM} a set of entities, and we use E(e) to
indicate such information related to an entity e;;
(ii) we denote as Eτ = {e1, e2, . . . , eN} the entities in E detected by a tracker
device within τ seconds after the detection of an entity (then Eτ ⊆ E),
and we use Eτ (e) to indicate such information related to an entity e;
(iii) we denote as L = {l1, l2, . . . , lO} a set of geographic locations, with l =
{latitude, longitude}, and we use l(e) to indicate such information related
to an entity e, when it is detected by a tracker device;
(iv) we denote as T = {t1, t2, . . . , tP } a set of time-stamps, with t =
{yyyy-mm-dd-hh-mm-ss}, and we use t(e) to indicate the time-stamp re-
lated to the detection of an entity e by a tracker device;
(v) we denote as I = {i1, i2, . . . , iQ} a set of (GUIDs)
9, using the notation
i(e) to indicate the GUID associated to an entity e, as well as the notation
i(tracker) to indicate the GUID associated to a tracker device;
(vi) we denote as P = {p1, p2, . . . , pW } a payload, with p = {key, value}, and
we use P (e) to indicate a payload related to an entity e;
(vii) we denote asR = {r1, r2, . . . , rY } a set of registration made on a blockchain-
based distribute ledger, with r = {i(e), Eτ (e), l(e), t(e), P (e)}, and we use
r(e) and R(e) to indicate, respectively, a registration related to an entity
e and all the registrations related to that entity.
4 Approach Formulation
This section describes the implementation of the proposed IoE paradigm, which
has been divided in the following steps:
(i) Elements Definition: it introduces the concept of entity and tracker in
the IoE environment, as well as the method to use in order to assign them
a Globally Unique Identifier, outlining some possible operative scenarios;
(ii) Elements Detection: the detection process of an entity device is here
described, from the detection-time by a tracker device to the recording-
time of the collected data on a blockchain-based distributed ledger, focusing
on the characteristics of the state-of-the-art wireless technologies able to
perform these activities;
(iii) Elements Communication: it formalizes the data structures and the
software procedures able to merge the information related to the involved
entity and tracker devices, generating the data-structure that represent the
information to store on the blockchain-based distributed ledger ;
(iv) Elements Localization: extensively, it describes the activities made in
order to trace an entity, introducing some baseline strategies and a se-
ries of localization rules aimed to exploit the available information on the
blockchain, directly or indirectly.
9 Globally Unique IDentifiers, whose structure is formally defined in the RFC-4122,
which is explained in Section 4.1.
Fig. 6. IoE Working Model
4.1 Elements Definition
The concept of entity is usually related to a person, but it could be also extended
to a large number of objects such as, for instance, vehicles or goods, and each
entity e is always associated to a Globally Unique Identifier (GUID).
The concept of tracker is instead related to a generic device able to detect
the entity devices, capturing their GUIDs and sensors data, and performing a
registration into a blockchain-based distributed ledger. Such a registration (i.e.,
the set r) is defined by joining entity and tracker data, according to the formal
notation defined in Section 3.
Listing 1.1. Globally Unique Identifier Data Structure
GUID = time−low ”−” time−mid ”−”
time−high−and−ve r s i on ”−”
c lock−seq−and−r e s e rv ed
c lock−seq−low ”−” node
time−low = 4hexOctet
time−mid = 2hexOctet
time−high−and−ve r s i on = 2hexOctet
c lock−seq−and−r e s e rv ed = hexOctet
c lock−seq−low = hexOctet
node = 6hexOctet
hexOctet = hexDig i t hexDig i t
hexDig i t = ”0” / ”1” / ”2” / ”3” / ”4” / ”5” / ”6” / ”7” / ”8” / ”9” /
”a” / ”b” / ”c” / ”d” / ”e” / ” f ” /
”A” / ”B” / ”C” / ”D” / ”E” / ”F”
The unique identifier of the tracker devices could be already available (e.g.,
MAC-address, IP-address, etc.), while that of the new entity devices placed in
the IoE environment needs to be defined and assigned. Its generation can be
made in several ways [31,72], but the two most common methods are: (i) on
the basis of a serial numbers created by following an incremental or sequential
criterion; (ii) on the basis of a random numbers generated by using a range
of numbers enough larger to classify the expected number of objects. In the
proposed approach, we perform this operation by using one of the most effective
methods: the Globally Unique Identifier.
Globally Unique Identifier: The Globally Unique Identifier (GUID), also
known as Universally Unique Identifier (UUID), is a 128-bit integer number
which is commonly used in order to identify resources uniquely [37]. When it
needs, such a information can be combined with additional information (e.g.,
related to one or more resource characteristics) in order to identify the same
resource in different contexts. Listing 1.1 reports the formal definition of a GUID
string, and f81d4fae-7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6 represents an example of this
one. Several algorithms able to generate this information are described in [37].
Through the application of the birthday paradox [26,43] we can obtain a
mathematically demonstration of the GUID robustness in terms of hash collision
probability. By following this mathematical approach, considering that a GUID
is a 128-bit long number, we can identify a million billion entities before we have
a one in a billion possibility (i.e., 1015) to get a collision, as shown in Equation 1,
which is based on the aforementioned birthday paradox.
n ≈
√
−2129 · ln(1− 10−9) ≈ 1, 000, 000, 000, 000, 000 (1)
Some considerations can be made about the policies to adopt in order to
assign the GUID to each entity device that operates into the IoE environment,
assuring that this information remains stable along the time. This because the
IoE tracing mechanism is based on such information and a change of it (i.e.,
the device GUID) during the life of an entity device leads towards inconsistent
data.
Some solutions involve or a centralized GUID distribution, such as in [41],
offered as service to the users by following a free or paid modality, or an au-
tonomous generation of this information made directly by the users [37]. It
should be added that in order to distinguish the IoE devices from the other
classes of devices that operate in the wireless-based environment, it is appropri-
ate to reserve part of the GUID information for this purpose.
Operative Scenarios: About the hardware to use in the IoE environment in
order to allow the entity devices to interact with the tracker ones, we can outline
several scenarios:
(i) the entity device is characterized by limited or absent hardware resources
(e.g., CPU, memory, etc), then it performs the identification process by
exploiting passive technologies such as, for instance, RFID10. In this first
10 Radio-Frequency IDentification.
scenario, the tracker device must be able to manage the identification pro-
cess adopted by the entity;
(ii) the entity device has hardware resources that allow it to adopt active tech-
nologies for the identification process (e.g., 6LoWPAN and ZigBee, both
defined by the technical standard IEEE 802.15.4 ). This is the most com-
mon scenario, where the entity device uses canonical wireless technologies
and the tracker device does not need any additional capability in order to
interact with it;
(iii) the entity device is able to perform processes that require considerable
hardware/software resources. Such a scenario allows us to move on the
IoE -side some processes usually performed in the tracker -side and it also
allows the IoE device to handle complex processes related to its sensors.
The scenario taken into consideration in this paper is the second one, where
the IoE device is characterized by enough hardware/software resources that
allow it to use active technologies for its identification, because it allows us to
implement the IoE immediately and in a transparent way, postponing the other
scenarios to possible future implementations.
4.2 Elements Detection
As shown in the high-level working model of Figure 6, when an entity e enters
within the coverage area of a tracker device, such a device detects its identifier
i (i.e., the GUID, as formalized in Section 3), and it creates and submits a
registration r on a blockchain-based distributed ledger.
The detection time of an entity e is indicated in Figure 6 as data capture and
it coincides with the time-stamp t, which represents the point in the space where
the entity is detected by a tracker device and the r information are submitted
to the blockchain-based distributed ledger.
All the above operation are managed by using specific data structures, whose
possible implementation has been proposed in Section 4.3.
Wireless Technologies: About the technology to use in order to broadcast
the entity GUID, the literature offers several solutions in terms of technolo-
gies and protocols able to perform this operation [3]. Some examples of them
are: Internet Protocol Version 6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Net-
works (6LoWPAN ), Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE ), Z-Wave, ZigBee, Near Field
Communication (NFC ), Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID), SigFox, and
2G/3G. SigFox and 2G/3G are classified as Low-Power Wide Area Network
(LPWAN ) protocols, while the other ones as Short-range Wireless protocols.
Their characteristics have been summarized in Table 1, where the reported
ranges (i.e., frequency range and operative range) indicates only the lowest and
the highest supported value (e.g., if the protocol supports 125KHz, 13.56MHz,
and 860MHz, we report 125KHz ÷ 860MHz).
The choice of protocol should be made by taking into account the entity type,
since in case of a person such a choice should be oriented toward protocols able to
ensure a low-power consumption and a mid/short operative range, while in case
of objects (e.g., a vehicle) the choice could be instead oriented toward protocols
characterized by a long operative range and a mid/high power consumption.
However, the above considerations are strongly related to the context of a
custom IoE device, since when it is a standard device such as, for instance, a
smart-phone or a tablet, the choice of the wireless protocols is driven by those
supported by the operating system (e.g., 802.11 b/g/n [69] and Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE ) [25] protocols).
Table 1. Wireless Technologies
Wireless Frequency Data Operative Power Security Literature
technology range rate range consumption protocols reference
6LoWPAN 868MHz÷2.4GHz 250KBps 10÷100m low AES [48]
BLE 2.4GHz 1MBps 15÷30m low E0, Stream, AES-128 [25]
Z-Wave 868MHz÷908MHz 40KBps 30÷100m low AES-128 [36]
ZigBee 2.4GHz 250KBps 10÷100m low AES [33]
NFC 868MHz÷902MHz 106÷424KBps 0÷1m Ultra-low RC4 [16]
RFID 125KHz÷928MHz 4MBps 0÷200m Ultra-low RSA,AES [30]
SigFox 125KHz÷860MHz 100÷600Bps 10÷50Km low no-specific [55]
2G/3G 380MHz÷1.9GHz 10MBps Several Kms High RC4 [51]
4.3 Elements Communication
The communication between an entity e and a tracker device can be performed
by adopting very simple data structures, whose possible formalization are pro-
posed in Figure 7 and Figure 8.
They refer, respectively, to the data structure used to transmit data from an
entity device to a tracker device (i.e., entity-side) and to the data structure used
to transmit the registration data from a tracker device to the blockchain-based
distributed ledger (i.e., tracker-side).
About the Entity-side data structure, the GUID information, which is 128 -
bit long, is stored by using 5 groups of hexadecimal digits, with the following size:
8 hexadecimal digits, 4 hexadecimal digits, 4 hexadecimal digits, 4 hexadecimal
digits, and 12 hexadecimal digits.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819202122232425262728293031
Entity : Globally Unique Identifier
Entity : Local Payload
...

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Entity
Device
Data
Fig. 7. Entity-side Data Structure
The registration data r are defined by merging a series of identification data
(Tracker Primary Data) with the sensors data related both to the entity and
tracker devices activity (Tracker Payload Data) In some contexts, the Payload
Data could be partially (only the entity or tracker sensors data) or completely
absent (no sensors data) and, in this cases, the entity information will be the
GUID, the location, and the time-stamp.
About the hardware/software process performed in the entity-side, it is lim-
ited to broadcast its data (GUID and local payload) at regular time intervals, by
using the wireless functionality. About the tracker-side hardware/software pro-
cess, when there are not active other priority tasks, the tracker device operates
a listening activity aimed to detect entities in its wireless coverage area, sending
the collected entity and tracker data to the blockchain-based distributed ledger.
It should be observed that in the data structures we classified the payload
on the basis of the data which it refers, using the term local to indicate that
generated by the entity device and global to indicate that generated by the
tracker device, which also include the local payload.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516171819202122232425262728293031
Entity : Globally Unique Identifier
Entity : Neighbor Entities List
...
Tracker : Latitude Tracker : Longitude
Tracker : Timestamp
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
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Primary
Data
Entity + Tracker : Global Payload
...

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Fig. 8. Tracker-side Data tructure
The data anonymity and data immutability offered by a blockchain-based
distributed ledger, joined with the low-cost of the devices needed for the data
transmission and with the wireless coverage offered by the ever increasing number
of wireless-based devices, given life to a powerful environment on which is based
the proposed IoE paradigm.
The data that we need to store on the blockchain-based distributed ledger is
that described in Section 3: the first field i contains the Globally Unique Identifier
of the IoE entity; the field Eτ contains, when it is applicable, a list of Globally
Unique Identifiers related to the other entities captured together with the entity
e in a defined temporal frame τ ; the l field contains the geographic position (i.e.,
latitude and longitude) of the tracker device that detected the entity e; the field
t reports when the data capture event occurred, in the format yyyy-mm-dd-hh-
mm-ss ; the last field P contains a series of values in the format key,value which
refer to the sensors data of the entity device (local payload) and to the sensors
data of the tracker device (global payload).
Software Procedures: The software to use in order to perform the entity-
tracker and tracker-ledger communications can be an update, in case of IoE and
custom devices, or an application (app), in most of the other cases (i.e., smart-
phones, tablets, and similar devices). It has to fulfill the IoE paradigm needs,
from the entity-detection to the data-registration, by performing the following
operations:
1. entity-side: it provides to broadcast the device GUID along with the payload
(i.e., local sensors data), by using the built-in wireless device functionality;
2. tracker-side: it performs a listening activity aimed to detect and recognize
(distinguishing them from the other devices through the mechanism adopted
in the implementation phase, for instance, a specificGUID preamble) entities
within its wireless coverage area;
3. tracker-side: it appends the tracker device data (i.e., primary and payload
data) with the data transmitted by the entity device (i.e., GUID and pay-
load), building a data packet suitable for a registration on the blockchain-
based distributed ledger ;
4. tracker-side: it submits the defined data packet on the blockchain-based dis-
tributed ledger, in order to perform an immutable registration of the entity
device activity;
5. tracker-side: it waits to receive from the blockchain-based distributed ledger
the registration acknowledge of the submitted packet, otherwise it repeats
the submission.
A series of custom data-dashboards11 can be also designed in order to manage
all the processes involved in the IoE paradigm, first of all, that related to the
constant tracking of the entities.
Algorithm 1 Blockchain-based distributed ledger data gathering
Require: e=Entity, R=Blockchain-based distributed ledger registrations
Ensure: Rˆ=Registrations related to entity e
1: procedure getEntityRegistrations(e, R)
2: for each r in R do
3: i← getEntityGUID(r)
4: if i(e) == eˆ then
5: Rˆ ← r(e)
6: end if
7: end for
8: return Rˆ
9: end procedure
11 A management tool able to display, track and analyze a series of information.
4.4 Elements Localization
When we need to investigate about an entity e, first we get all needed data
related to it by performing a data gathering process, such as that reported in
Algorithm 1, then we can manage such data through different strategies, such
as the baseline ones described below:
1. Direct Tracing: by following this strategy, the movements of an entity e,
from its first introduction in the IoE environment, are traced by using the
information l(e) and t(e) in r(e), ∀r(e) ∈ R(e), according to the formalization
given in Section 3.
This process is shown in Figure 9, which refers to six detection points l of
an entity e, chronologically numbered by using the time-stamp information
t. In more detail, we first query the blockchain-based distribute ledger in
order to extract all the registrations R(e), then we number each location
l(e) ∈ r(e), ∀r(e) ∈ R(e) (i.e., latitude an longitude) along the chronological
sequence given by the time-stamp information t(e) ∈ r(e).
More formally, given a series of entity locations l(e) ∈ L, we introduce a
Trace Location Set ω = {l1, l2, . . . , lZ} aimed to store, in the chronologically
order determined by the time-stamp information t(e) ∈ T , all the locations
l(e) ∈ L, as formalized in Equation 2.
ω ← l(e) | ∀ l(e) in L
with l1 < l2 < . . . < lZ ∧ l ∈ ω
(2)
It should be noted that the localization resolution is directly related to the
tracker device that has detected the entity. We can obtain a high-resolution
localization when the tracker device runs a localization service (e.g., GPS )
and then its location is near that of the detected entity. We instead obtain a
low-resolution localization when the localization data are related to another
device, as happens when the tracker device operates in the mobile network
but without any active localization service, since in this case the location
could refer to the mobile network cell.
This is represented in Figure 9 and Figure 10: the high-resolution localization
coincides with the entity map-point, while the low-resolution localization
can be considered any map-points within the grid-square where the entity
is placed, which represents the mobile network cell.
2. Interpolate Tracing: in this strategy we take into account the information
l(e), t(e), and Eτ (e) in r(e), ∀r(e) ∈ R(e). The Eτ (e) information contains,
when it is applicable, the other entities detected by the tracker device within
τ seconds from the e (the entity under analysis) detection, as described in
Section 3.
We exploit the new information in order to reconstruct the entity movements
by interpolating the l(e) ∈ r(e), ∀r(e) ∈ R(e) data with the same data of
the entities in Eτ (e) (neighbor entities). This process is graphically shown
Fig. 9. IoE Direct T racing
in Figure 10, where + denotes the entity under analysis and N a neighbor
entity in Eτ (e).
In the example of interpolate tracing shown in figure, we can observe how the
first localization of the entity + includes a neighbor N that we found another
time in the third location of the location chronology of +. This represents a
naive example of interpolate tracing, based on the reasonable probability that
such a configuration indicates that the neighbor entity is somehow related
to the main entity under analysis, especially when this pattern repeats over
time. In other words, it is very likely that in the second localization of N, the
entity + was also present, and that it has not been detected for some reasons
such as, for instance, a temporary tracker device overload, or because the
entity device was out of the tracker wireless range. This pattern, repeated
over time, could underline interesting connections between entities, as well
as the last location of a missing entity.
More formally, given the Trace Location Set ω = {l1, l2, . . . , lZ} previously
defined and given a series of entity locations L(e) = {l1, l2, . . . , lO}, at each
location l ∈ L(e) (with O ≥ 3) we extract from the set Eτ (e) a subset of
valuable12 neighbor entities by following the criterion in Equation 3.
ω ← l(e) | if e in Et(lo−1) ∧ e in Et(lo+1), ∀ e in Eτ
with l1 < l2 < . . . < lZ ∧ l ∈ ω
(3)
We can generalize the aforementioned criterion by varying the distance be-
tween the step Eτ (e) (i.e., where we extract the valuable neighbor entities
from E(e)) and the previous and next step that we take into account. De-
noting as α such a distance (i.e., the number of considered locations), we
can re-formalize the former criterion as shown in Equation 4.
ω ← l(e) | if e in Et(lo−α) ∧ e in Et(lo+α)
with l1 < l2 < . . . < lZ ∧ l ∈ ω
(4)
12 Entities able to be exploited in the context of the Interpolate Tracing strategy.
It should be underlined how during this activity we do not infringe the
privacy of the involved neighbor entities, since the entity data are collected
anonymously into the blockchain-based distributed ledger.
Fig. 10. IoE Interpolate T racing
3. Spread Tracing: this last baseline criterion exploits all the neighbor entities
in Eτ , with e 6= eˆ and |Eτ | ≥ 2, where eˆ denotes the entity under analysis.
We add as valuable neighbor entities of eˆ all the entities that in their loca-
tions in L have eˆ as neighbor entity, as shown in Equation 5.
ω ← l(e) | if eˆ in Eτ (e), ∀ l(e) in L
with l1 < l2 < . . . < lZ ∧ l ∈ ω
(5)
The result can be expressed as the tracing matrix Ξ shown in Equation 6,
where each row refers to a different valuable entity e. In other words, each
matrix-row refers to a different valuable entity e and it reports the locations
l where the entity e has the entity eˆ as neighbor in Eτ (e).
Ξ(e) =


l1, l2, · · · , lO
l1, l2, · · · , lO
...
...
. . .
...
l1, l2, · · · , lO

 (6)
After ordering the matrix-row elements by location and after counting how
many entities eˆ are involved in each matrix-column, we can evaluate the
probability that the entity e was in a specific position, although it has not
been detected by a tracker device. This criterion is graphically shown in Fig-
ure 11, where the grid-size (i.e., square-side) represents a tolerance value,
which we denoted as ∆. This meand that all the entity-detections that occur
into the same grid-square refer to the same matrix-row-index (i.e., Equa-
tion 6).
Fig. 11. IoE Spread Tracing
It should be noted how the grid of Figure 11 represents a different informa-
tion, with respect to that of Figure 9 and Figure 10, since in this case it does
not represent the mobile network cells but the tolerance value ∆.
All the aforementioned criteria can be combined in order to define a more
complex criterion based on different localization rules. In addition, all criteria
have been formalized by exploiting only few of the available information, which
can be fully exploited in order to improve the localization strategies (e.g., by
inferring further details from the sensors data).
5 Future Directions
Considering that a complete and fully-functional implementation of the proposed
IoE paradigm is beyond the scope of this paper, which is mainly aimed to expose
the theoretical concepts that revolve around our core idea, delineating several
application scenarios, this section introduces some future directions, making also
some general considerations about its potential spread.
5.1 Secure Payload Storing
A future extension of the IoE paradigm could be designed in order to manage
as payload large and/or sensitive sensors data, by recurring both to external
storage services and encryption protocols. Such a problem arises with regard to
the payload data generated by the tracker device that detect an entity, since
such data could be refer to sensitive information generated by some classes of
sensors such as, for instance, microphones and video cameras, instead than non-
sensitive information generated by other classes of sensors (e.g., temperature
sensors, humidity sensors, etc.).
A possible and effective solution able to face this problem is based on the
asymmetric encryption model [66], which analogously to the canonical encryp-
tion mechanism adopted nowadays in a number of applications (e.g., SSH,
OpenPGP, S/MIME, etc.)13, is exploited in order to encrypt the data locally
(when the tracker functionalities allow us this operation) or remotely (e.g., in a
distributed database).
Data Encryption: The data encryption is performed by using the tracker de-
vice public key. In this way only it has the possibility to decrypt the data by
using its private key, although the involved entity has the access to that data in
encrypted form. The entire process has been summarized in Figure 12.
Fig. 12. Data Encryption Process
How already happens in the context of the blockchain technology, where the
private key cryptography mechanism provides a powerful ownership method that
fulfills the authentication requirements (i.e., the ownership is private-key-based),
without the need to share more personal information, also in this context such
a mechanism grants both privacy and ownership.
When there is the need to investigate about an entity by using such encrypted
data, for instance in case of a criminal event, such as a kidnapping or a theft,
the data access can be obtained through the involved authorities in charge. In
case of minor events, it is possible to exclude this information, using the other
ones (e.g., location, time-stamp, etc.).
Data Hashing: The connection between the encrypted data, stored locally or
remotely, and the entity is possible by using as data-name a string generated by a
hash function [8]. Such a function is a special class of hash functions largely used
in cryptography. Some common examples are:MD4 [57], SHA [10], TIGER [42],
and WHIRLPOOL [67].
In more detail, by adopting a mathematical algorithm is possible to map data
(characterized by arbitrary size) to a bit string (characterized by a fixed size).
The result is defined hash and it represents a one-way function that is infeasible
to invert. The literature usually refers to the input data as message and to the
output data (i.e., the hash) as message digest or digest.
Through an hash process, whose process is shown in Figure 13, is possible
to validate the data integrity of a file, detecting all modification since each of
13 Secure Socket Shell, Open Pretty Good Privacy, Secure Multi-Purpose Internet Mail
Extensions
Fig. 13. Data Hashing Process
them changes the hash output. While an encryption process represents a two-way
function based on the encryption and decryption operations, hashing represents
a one-way function that transforms in an irreversible manner the source data
used as input into a plain text output (i.e., the hash of data).
5.2 IoE Technology Spread
As happened with other similar technologies, even in the case of the proposed
IoE one, the greatest obstacle to overcome is the spread across users of such a
technology.
Although it is possible to create a new network of devices that operate ac-
cording to the proposed IoE paradigm, we can substantially reduce this problem
by integrating the IoE network into the existing wireless-based ones (e.g., IoT
and mobile). This process, which allows us to maximize the IoE potential, can
be facilitate by adopting several strategies, such as, the following ones:
(i) designing simple and transparent procedure of integration of the needed
IoE functionalities in the existing tracker devices, for instance, by inte-
grating these as a service in the new devices, by recurring to a simple
and well documented firmware/software upgrade process, or by making
available an application, in those cases where the trackers or the entities
are implemented in devices that allow us this solution (e.g., smart-phones,
tablets, etc.);
(ii) making effective campaigns of information aimed to underline the advan-
tages for each user that joins the IoE network, empathizing the gained
opportunity to exchange information between a large community of users,
an huge amount of valuable data that they can exploit in many contexts,
such as that of security taken into account in this paper;
(iii) offering benefits to the users that join their devices to the IoE network
as trackers, allowing the system to perform the entity detection and the
distributed-ledger registration tasks. Such a benefits could include the free-
use of some services related to the IoE network, such as, for instance, the
services used for the remote data storage.
As previously underlined, the exploitation of the mobile network contributes
to impress a substantial acceleration to the spread of the IoE network, since such
a network already involves an enormous number of devices that are potentially
configurable, by recurring to simple applications, to operate according to the
IoE paradigm. In this case, the information related to the geographic location
of the trackers can be obtained by a local service (i.e., GPS ) or by querying the
mobile cell to which the tracker is connected. The sensors data related to the
tracker -side will be those available for that device, otherwise this kind of data
will be absent.
A consideration should be made about the fact that the use case taken into
account in this paper is based on the interaction between entities and track-
ers, implementing by using custom (e.g., wearable solutions) or standard (IoT,
smart-phone, and tablet) devices, but the IoE potentiality could be improved by
adding to the IoE network other classes of devices such as, for instance, routers,
access-points, hot-spots, and many others. Although this type of expansion is
potentially practicable, it requires an implementation effort that is greater than
that required by using the devices we considered in this paper.
Business Models: Some conclusive general observations are about the exploita-
tion of the proposed IoE paradigm in the context of a hypothetical commercial
scenario. From the point of view of a Business-to-Business (B2B) model, we
can start by observing that many financial analysts underline that only the area
related to the IoT has given rise to an interesting and profitable financial mar-
ket, whose value in the next 5-10 years has been estimated around trillions of
dollars [34].
Consequently, as specialized sub-area of the wireless-based technologies mar-
ket, the proposed IoE paradigm could offer new stimulating and profitable op-
portunities, considering that its applications involve a huge number of customers,
both private and commercial ones. Summarizing, the activity core could be ori-
ented towards the development of IoE solutions for business customers, who
in turn can offer this service to their customers, according to a Business-to-
Consumer (B2C ) model.
Such solutions involve both hardware and software aspects, from the hard-
ware/software development of the IoE devices (e.g., wearable devices, smart-
phone applications, vehicle equipments, etc.) to the management of the needed
services (e.g., unique identifier distribution, remote storage, etc).
In some cases, these opportunities could be further expanded by defining and
offering services in partnership with public and/or private investigative agencies
(e.g., security guards, local police, etc), giving rise to a very interesting transversal
market.
A B2C scenario could also include other services such as, for instance, the
management of entities initially directly managed by customers or the develop-
ment and commercialization of custom hardware and software solutions.
6 Conclusion
In this Internet -based age, the enormous benefits related to the new technologies
are dramatically jeopardized by a series of security issues given by an ever in-
creasing number of people that try to get advantages from them, in a fraudulent
way. This scenario of insecurity is further complicated by the traditional secu-
rity issues that affect our modern societies, such as, for instance, kidnappings,
frauds, thefts, and so on.
The state-of-the-art security paradigms do not exploit in a better way the
opportunities offered by some powerful technologies such as those related to the
wireless-based smart devices or the Internet of Things, which involves millions of
active devices, or those related to the blockchain-based distributed ledgers, which
allow to certify a series of events.
This paper introduces a new security paradigm, which we baptized Internet
of Entities (IoE ), designed to join the capabilities offered by the wireless-based
devices environment with the certification capability offered by the blockchain-
based distributed ledgers. It is mainly based on two core components, entities
and trackers, which are billion of new or already-existing devices able to operate
interchangeably across the IoE environment.
Although the proposed paradigm is based on existing and wide spread tech-
nologies, it offers a novel way to trace in a certified and anonymous way the
activity of an entity, person or object, exploiting a combination of wireless-
based and blockchain-based technologies, which produce valuable, exploitable,
and investigative-valid data.
The same mechanisms adopted in the blockchain-based applications have
been exploited in the proposed paradigm in order to ensure the immutability
of data remotely stored on a blockchain-based distribute ledger, as well as their
anonymity.
The concept of robust network in its unstructured simplicity, expressed by
Satoshi Nakamoto during his Bitcoin formulation [49], well describes also the
Internet of Entities network, whose capabilities are destined to grow, day after
day, thanks to the continuous introduction of new wireless-based devices, which
provide an ever expanding IoE coverage area.
Concluding, if on the one hand, the proposed IoE paradigm can be easily
implemented by exploiting existing and wide spread technologies and infrastruc-
tures, on the other hand, it produces a series of advantages for the community,
revealing a great potential for growth in many real-world scenarios, such as that
of the security taken into consideration in this paper.
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